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BOOK REVIEW
JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE
CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT
Translated and edited by John M. Maki. Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1980.
Pp. x, 413. $25.00.
Reviewed by Frank K. Upham*
Given a broad mandate to "investigate and deliberate on problems related" to the Constitution and to report their results to the Congress, what
might a group of largely conservative, largely Republican Party politicians, academics, lawyers, -and businessmen suggest? We will never
know in the United States. Nor is it a matter of much concern, since even
in these days of dissatisfaction with aspects of constitutional development
no significant political group advocates the wholesale revision of the U.S.
Constitution. Such is not the case in Japan. There, constitutional revision
was a major political objective of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) in the decade after the Allied occupation and is still debated today. I This translation now makes the contours of that debate much more
accessible to Westerners.
The source of conservative dissatisfaction with the Constitution of Japan is plain. Drafted by a foreign general, 2 it articulates a value system
antithetical to that which the prewar government had imposed on Japanese society. 3 Its language and style were, at least to many older Japa*
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1. For the rise and fall of revisionism, see Fukui, Twenty Years ofRevisionism, in THE CONSTITUTON OF JAPAN 41 (D. Henderson ed. 1968). Contemporary debate on Japanese constitutional revision
tends to focus on specific amendments, particularly the anti-war clause of Article 9, rather than on
challenging the validity of the Constitution as a whole.
2. General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP), presided over
the Allied occupation of Japan and the drafting by SCAP officials of the postwar Japanese Constitution. For an account of the drafting of the Constitution, see K. KAWAI, JAPAN'S AMERICAN INTERLUDE
(1960). For a personal account by the official directly responsible for the drafting, see C. WHITNEY,
MACARTHUR 241-62 (1956).
3. Many would go further to state that the Constitution is antithetical to Japanese values and
traditions in general. Such an interpretation is, in my opinion, doubly mistaken. First, it underestimates the strength of liberal democratic tendencies in prewar Japan, generally included in the rubric
of "Taisho democracy." Second, it ignores the Japanese government's affirmative role in creating
and strengthening selected values and traditions in prewar Japan that suited their conception of Japanese society. For a description of the role of the legal system in that process, see Haley, The Politics
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nese, offensively foreign and a constant reminder of the humiliating circumstances of its enactment. Its political and intellectual foundation in
Western individualism was seen as destructive of many valued Japanese
institutions, particularly the traditional family, and of the social ideal of
harmony and consensus promoted by the government. The famous renunciation of war in Article 9 was considered both ridiculously idealistic and
an obstacle to the full restoration of Japan's sovereignty.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1956 the LDP was able to overcome strong Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) opposition in the Diet to pass
a statute establishing the Commission on the Constitution. The Commission's task was to study the enactment and operation of the Constitution
and to report its conclusions to the Diet. The Commission was thus the
political creation of the LDP and was viewed by opposition parties and
most legal scholars at the time as merely a stalking-horse for reactionary
constitutional revision. The result turned out to be somewhat different.
Despite the refusal by the JSP and many leading law professors to participate, the Commission did not become the mouthpiece of the revisionist
faction of the LDP. It did not, in fact, reach any collective conclusions
whatsoever on revision and acted very unlike a politically controlled caucus with a predetermined ideological mission. Instead, it emphasized
fact-finding and neutrality; the Report reads more like an agreement to
disagree than a political call to action.
The Commission's workload alone was impressive: 131 plenary sessions and 325 committee and subcommittee meetings with 418 expert
witnesses; fifty-six public hearings with testimony from 487 representatives of the public; and an accumulation of published documents occupying eight feet of shelf space. The unabridged Final Report is over 1,000
pages long and represents the culmination of close to seven years of factfinding, deliberation, and drafting. Although inevitably one-sided in its
approach to several constitutional issues, the Report can hardly be faulted
for lack of coverage or for a failure to be balanced in its presentation of
divergent views.
The credit for this transformation is due largely to the selection of Takayanagi Kenzb as chairman 4 and the subsequent adoption of basic policies for fact-finding and deliberation that ensured openness and balance in
the Commission's proceedings. First, all Commission meetings beyond
those of the steering committee were open to the public and the media,
of Informal Justice: The Japanese Experience, 1922-1942, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE
125 (R. Abel ed. 1981).

4.

For Takayanagi's own account of his tenure as chairman and of the Commission's operations.

see Takayanagi. Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the Constitution. in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, supra note 1. at 7 1.
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and transcripts were made available to any interested person. Second, the
Commission called on the expertise and experience of non-members
rather than relying solely on that of the commissioners. To that end, a
group of expert witnesses, which eventually included many scholars who
had initially refused to participate, was asked to testify, and public hearings were held throughout Japan to give ordinary citizens a chance to appear. Third, and perhaps most important for the character of the proceedings, the Commission decided not to use majority rule in drafting
committee and final reports. Instead, the whole range of opinions were
reported with a statement of their reasons.
The Final Report, which has been well translated and intelligently
edited by John M. Maki, demonstrates to an almost excruciating extent
this concern for fairness and balance. The first three parts of the Report
chronicle the creation, structure, procedure, and central issues of the
Commission's work. In doing so, they catalog issues and positions and
explain the mechanics of the Commission, but do little else. For those
interested in the substantive views espoused, Part Four, The Opinions of
the Commissioners, will hold the most interest.
Part Four constitutes almost half of the volume and consists largely of a
recitation of summarized views, pro and con, on each chapter of the Constitution. Fortunately these dutiful but, at times, rather bland restatements
of varying positions, are frequently invigorated by verbatim quotations
from individual commissioners. Here, one is reminded that behind the
meticulous balance and neutrality of the FinalReport were red-blooded
men (and one woman) with strongly held and often emotional views on
the Constitution and its role in Japanese society. Generally, though, the
Report avoids controversy. Statements of both the revisionist and antirevisionist views are included throughout. For example, the Report notes
the revisionist view on individual rights: "[T]he present is not the age of
the liberal state which overemphasizes respect for individual rights and
freedoms, but the age of the welfare state which has as its aim the well
being of the entire people, and accordingly Chapter 3 ["Rights and Duties of the People"] needs to be revised to conform to the contemporary
age.''5 There then quickly follows the anti-revisionist view: "[T]here is
nothing contradictory between the principles of the welfare state and of
,,6 The inevrespect for the rights and freedoms of the individual ....
itable result of the "first A, then B" approach in drafting is the lack of a
clear, well-developed argument for or against revision, and the creation
5.

JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUION: THE FINAL REPORT 273 (J. Maki trans. & ed.

1980).
6. Id. at 274.
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of a document that is more of a laundry list of issues and opinions than a
satisfying analysis of current constitutional problems and interpretations.
That does not mean that the Report is valueless or invariably tedious to
read. The Report represents and catalogs the vast amount of material
amassed by the Commission, and its coverage of the significant constitutional issues makes it as comprehensive a statement of the political and
intellectual currents surrounding the Japanese Constitution in its first two
decades as is likely to become available. The frequent excerpts from individual commissioners' opinions also give the reader a good sense of the
social and political concerns and goals of the revisionist majority.
Not surprisingly, the aspects of the Constitution most galling to the
commissioners were its origin-which for many meant that revision was
necessary regardless of the substance of the Constitution-and the renunciation of war and the maintenance of war potential in Article 9. The latter was criticized not only for its idealism, but also because it meant that
there were no appropriate constitutional provisions for civilian control of
the Self Defense Forces (SDF), which, all agreed, were here to stay, and
because Article 9 also supposedly made it impossible for Japan to participate in U.N. peace-keeping forces.
The commissioners were also concerned about the "Rights and Duties
of the People," which makes up Chapter 3 of the Japanese Constitution.
The commissioners' objections to strong guarantees for individual civil
rights and liberties were not phrased in the common conservative American lexicon of national security and sexual morality. Instead, the Japanese commissioners' objections were based on fears that the assertion of
individual rights would impede the realization of the modem welfare
state, which all commissioners agreed to be the goal of postwar Japan.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Report, however, at least from
an American perspective, is the almost total lack of discussion of the Japanese Supreme Court and its decisions. The Report discusses judicial review with general approval, but only at the abstract level of political theory rather than at the level of particular cases. General debate on other
issues, likewise, is almost invariably on the level of constitutional theory,
most frequently repeating the ritualistic "living constitution"/" strictconstructionist" arguments associated with all written constitutions. The
dearth of concrete controversy is eloquent testimony to the peripheral role
played by the Japanese Supreme Court up to the mid-1960's. There simply were not many constitutional precedents for the commissioners to discuss, and even fewer that would be objectionable to conservative politicians.
Had the JSP chosen to participate in the Commission, debate might
have been considerably more focused. Lack of opposition participation is
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clearly the Report's greatest weakness. Despite the Commission's sincere
attempt to open debate to all positions, the Report remains basically a
dialog between those in favor of conservative revision and those opposed
to any revision, with the latter arguing that political practice and judicial
interpretation will bring even the more idealistic provisions into line with
political reality. Other possible positions, such as the argument that the
Constitution should be interpreted literally to bar the SDF, are frequently
not even mentioned. One regrets in particular the narrowness of perspective in the section on the role of the Emperor, which is otherwise quite
complete and lively. Without a statement of the Left's position, this section leaves the reader with the inaccurate impression that the existence of
the imperial institution is not controversial. A strong Marxist polemic on
the political and psychological effect of the imperial institution, or even a
summarized version of it, would have completed the circle of argument
and made the Report a much fuller statement of the political context of the
times.
Given the political origin of the Commission, however, an opposition
boycott was inevitable. Certainly Chairman Takayanagi and the Commission made every effort to convince the JSP to reconsider its position and,
thereafter, to conduct the proceedings in as open and democratic a manner as possible. Should wholesale constitutional revision again become a
serious political concern, it is hard to imagine that conservative prorevisionist and moderate anti-revisionist views could be articulated more
completely or fairly in the ensuing debate than they were in this Report.
The result, although perhaps not all one might wish for, remains an
invaluable record of the political currents of the time and of the Japanese
Constitution's first crisis of legitimacy.
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